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Abstract
The neglect of administrative issues is a serious limitation of optimal tax theory,
with implications for its practical applicability. Under uncertainty, the problems for
optimal tax theory are compounded when the full set of tax instruments is neglected.
These twin issues are addressed in this paper, by focussing on a fundamental im-
plication of administrative problems, namely, that the tax bases are measured with
some error. Consumption taxes can perform the ‘social insurance role of taxation’;
a role previously ascribed only to income taxes. A combination of income and con-
sumption taxes can hedge income and measurement-error risks better, relative to
the imposition of these taxes alone. The optimal taxes are decreasing in the impre-
cision with which the corresponding tax base is measured. The taxpayer engages in
precautionary savings, in response to uncertainty arising on account of income and
measurement problems. Diﬀerential commodity taxes, tailored to the measurability
characteristics of the diﬀerent tax bases, dominate uniform commodity taxes. Fur-
thermore, the paper provides a simple, tractable framework for optimal tax theorists
interested in diverse kinds of uncertain situations.
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+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk.2“As economists have been aware, the omitted constraints on communication, calcu-
lation and administration of an economy...limit the direct applicability of the impli-
cations of this theory to policy problems....” Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
1. Introduction
Two important considerations motivate this paper. First, despite their crucial importance
in actual policymaking, administrative issues are typically ignored in tax theory. Second,
the practice of ignoring the full set of tax instruments, especially under uncertainty, leads
to misleading results. The model is simple, tractable, and provides a useful template for
optimal tax theorists working in a range of problems where uncertainty of some sort is
important and explicit modeling is diﬃcult or impossible. Hence, the scope of the paper
goes beyond the issues it directly addresses. It is perhaps instructive to look more closely
at the two considerations that motivate the paper.
1.1. The importance of administrative issues
In normative tax theory, issues of taxation and proposals for tax reform are typically
evaluated on the basis of eﬃciency and equity considerations1. Administrative issues are
ignored in tax theory despite their importance in the actual implementation of tax policies.
The meaning of the generic term ‘administrative issues’ obviously depends on the context.
Nevertheless, if all tax bases were costlessly and publicly observed, then several important
categories of administrative issues would disappear. Hence, probably the most interesting
overarching implication of several kinds of ‘administrative issues’ must be that tax bases
are measured with some measurement error. As the discussion below will indicate, several
well-known discussions of administrative issues focus on the measurement error aspect of
administrative issues and this is the (reduced form) implication of administrative issues
that this paper concentrates on. In what follows, the terms ‘measurement errors’ and
‘administrative problems’, are used synonymously.
Despite the neglect of administrative problems in the theory of taxation, general com-
mentaries on tax policy often pose the choice between critical taxes, such as that between
consumption and income taxes, in terms of the relative diﬃculty of measuring the two tax
bases. For instance, Devereux (1996: 14) writes, “it is on administrative grounds that the
proponents of the expenditure tax have the strongest case. This has largely to do with
the problems of implementing a truly comprehensive income tax.” Bradford (1980) is very
explicit: “From this perspective, the winner of the great debate over the relative merits of
the consumption versus the income tax rests on an issue of measurability.”
In the context of income taxation, Boadway and Wildasin (1996: 98) point to se-
vere problems in the measurement of ‘capital income’. They write: “ In principle this
should include all forms of returns to assets including interest, dividends, accrued capital
gains, capital income from unincorporated business, imputed rent on consumer durables
(especially housing) and the imputed return of assets such as transactions balances and
1Textbook treatments can be found in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Myles (1995).
2insurance. These should all be indexed for inﬂation and should include an appropriate
risk premium. Unfortunately the measurement of these items is diﬃcult or impractical.”
Mintz (1997: 467-68) lists several problems in the measurement of a consumption tax base,
both, in its VAT version and in its registered versus non-registered asset treatment. These
problems include identiﬁcation of taxpayers, and issues of consumption versus business
expenses, real versus ﬁnancial transactions, wage versus self-employed income, treatment
of losses and tracking of transactions etc.
The measurement of several tax bases can be especially diﬃcult for developing coun-
tries. Burgess and Stern (1993: 798-99) identify some of the relevant factors: insuﬃcient
staﬀ with the appropriate skills, equipment, motivation, or honesty; complex legal and tax
structures; poor and inconsistent records that are often under the control of diﬀerent tax
authorities and lack of incentive based remuneration etc. Although rarely acknowledged,
developed countries often face similar problems. Fortin (1995: 2) writes: “A substantial
portion of Revenue Canada employees fails elementary tests of the knowledge of the tax
system. Even our best experts admit that they ﬁnd it very hard to keep up.”
Surveys of optimal taxation generally point to the lack of real world applicability of
tax theory on administrative grounds. Heady (1996: 33) writes that “One way in which
many models are unrealistic has already been mentioned: their neglect of administrative
costs...” Burgess and Stern (1993: 798) make similar remarks in the context of developing
countries. Slemrod (1990: 157) provides a cogent overview of the issues and writes that
“Diﬀerences in the ease of administrating various taxes have been and will continue to
be a critical determinant of appropriate tax policy.” Slemrod advocates incorporating
administrative issues into ‘optimal tax theory’ to generate a uniﬁed ‘Theory of Optimal
Tax Systems’. This paper can be viewed as one attempt in that direction.
1.2. The full set of tax instruments and uncertainty
A desirable modelling practice in optimal tax theory is to explicitly consider the full set of
tax instruments. Considering only a subset of the available taxes often results in erroneous
conclusions about the optimality of certain taxes. For instance, under certainty, Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976), Atkinson (1977) and Deaton and Stern (1986) have shown that under
certain conditions, commodity taxes are redundant in the presence of income taxes.
However, the full set of tax instruments are generally omitted in optimal tax models
involving uncertainty, as they were, in the seminal papers by Varian (1980) and Eaton
and Rosen (1980). The essential contribution of these papers was to identify the ‘social
insurance role of taxation’ in the presence of income uncertainty2. Cremer and Gavhari
(1995, 1999) and Mirrlees (1990) provide further insights on optimal taxation in the pres-
ence of uncertainty3. Cremer and Gahvari uncover a novel role for consumption taxes by
2For extensions, but mostly with a partial set of tax instruments, see the survey in Myles (1995).
3Cremer and Gahvari (1995, 1999) and Mirrlees (1990) consider consumption taxes but omit income
taxes. The argument is that ‘Given that the full set of commodity taxes is being used, the tax rate on
the wage is superﬂuous and can be set equal to zero without imposing any restrictions’; see for instance
Cremer and Gavhari (1995: 298). However, this does not hold true when both tax bases are observed
with some measurement error. In that case (see below) the optimal income and consumption taxes will
typically be strictly positive .
3distinguishing between goods that are consumed prior and posterior to the resolution of
income uncertainty, however, their focus is not on administrative issues. Mirrlees (1990)
comes closest to providing a theory of optimal tax systems under uncertainty, but assumes
that while the income tax base is observed with some error, there are no such problems
with measuring the consumption tax base.
This paper extends the basic model in Varian (1980) to take account of measurement
problems with the income as well as the consumption tax bases and the full set of taxes
is considered. The results are not tied to any particular source of measurement problems;
such problems are taken as given. Attention is focussed on ‘pure’ consumption and income
taxes, rather than on the speciﬁc institutional detail of any particular tax system, however,
the model seems reasonably amenable to such extensions.
The results are as follows. In the absence of income uncertainty and administrative
problems, a poll tax is optimal. Under income uncertainty, strictly positive income and
consumption taxes perform the social insurance role of taxation; that such a role is not the
exclusive domain of income taxes is not always reﬂected in the existing literature. When
tax administration issues are taken into account, strictly positive income and consumption
taxes are often optimal; some combination of these taxes typically provides superior hedg-
ing of the income and the measurement error risk for the taxpayer. This result suggests
a role that is similar to the idea of yardstick competition in the moral hazard literature.
That the optimal consumption tax should be positive in the presence of an income tax
is an important result given the originally pessimistic role for indirect taxes in Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976); in this respect the results in the paper also contribute to a growing
literature that justiﬁes a role for indirect taxes4.
Measurement errors in a tax base reduce the optimal tax on that base and also have
‘spillover eﬀects’ on taxes levied on other tax bases. The relative magnitudes of the two
taxes are inversely proportional to the relative diﬃculty of measuring the two tax bases.
The magnitude of any tax is directly proportional to its social insurance role relative to the
measurement error risk that it imposes. The taxpayer engages in precautionary savings,
in response to uncertainty arising on account of income and tax administration. Finally,
diﬀerential commodity taxes, tailored to the measurability characteristics of the diﬀerent
tax bases, dominate uniform commodity taxes.
In addition to providing sharp, closed form, results that have pedagogical merit, the
main attractiveness of the model is its simplicity and tractability in dealing with fairly
vexed questions. The questions posed in this paper are hardly novel, as the discussion
above shows, however, one suspects that the lack of theoretical progress in the area owes
much to lack of formal models that could provide a useful template for research. This paper
is an attempt to ﬁll that lacuna and hopefully provide the basis of a simple oﬀ-the-shelf
model that can be used to model a range of optimal tax situations under uncertainty.
Sections 2 through 4 adapt the model in Varian (1980) to the full set of tax instruments
and measurement problems. Subsection 4.3 explores the implications for precautionary
4For instance, Boadway and Pestieau (1994) deal with tax evasion features, Cremer and Gavhari (1999)
distinguish between those goods that are consumed before and after the resolution of income uncertainty.
Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001) introduce multidimensional heterogeniety among individuals. Each
of these amendments to the Atkinson-Stigiltz framework uncovers a role for consumption taxes.
4savings. Finally Section 5 examines the issue of uniform versus diﬀerentiated taxes. Section
6 concludes followed by the appendix. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Model
Consider the following stylized two-period model as in Varian (1980). A representative
t a x p a y e r ,w h e ny o u n g ,a l l o c a t e sﬁrst period income I1 between ﬁrst period consumption
C1 and savings S. In the second period, the taxpayer is old and second period income
I2 = S + η,w h e r eη is a normally distributed random shock with mean zero and variance
σ2
η; Varian (1980) interprets η as ‘idiosyncratic uncertainty’.
2.1. Description of the tax system
Taxation is levied only in the second period and the tax system has full loss-oﬀsets5.T h e
government levies a linear, progressive income tax with constant marginal rate θ and a
lumpsum payment α to the taxpayer; α>0 denotes transfer payments while α<0
signiﬁes a poll tax. After deducting the income tax, denote the taxpayer’s second period
disposable income by ID
2 , which identically equals before-tax second period consumption.
The government levies a linear consumption tax at the constant marginal tax rate τ on
disposable income, hence, the tax system is sequential; the consumption tax follows the
imposition of the income tax. Denote by Γ =( θ,α,τ), the tax vector chosen by the
government.
Due to administrative problems, the government observes the following imperfect sig-
nals, IO and CO, of the income and the consumption tax bases respectively
I




2 +  C (2.2)
where  I and  C are respectively, the measurement errors associated with measuring
the income and the consumption tax bases6. The measurement errors are independent of
the idiosyncratic uncertainty term η and are jointly normally distributed with zero mean,
respective variances σ2
I and σ2
C and with covariance given by σIC. Since the two tax bases
a r em e a s u r e dw i t hd i ﬀerent methods and techniques in practice7, thus, the distributions
5First period taxation introduces unnecessary complexity without aﬀecting the qualitative results.
Asides from imparting greater tractibility to the analysis, the full loss oﬀset assumption is not entirely
unrealistic. Most real world tax systems allow investors to set their losses from one source of income
against other sources of income. If all sources of income are taxed at the same rate (as in this paper) then
the tax system approximately behaves as if there were full loss oﬀsets.
6Measurement problems could arise from a wide variety of sources discussed in the introduction; the
model looks at a fairly generic problem however, that does not specify the precise source of the measure-
ment problem.
7The issues are succinctly summarized in Boadway and Wildasin (1996: 98-9). In a consumption tax,
relative to an income tax, “it is no longer imperative to measure capital income on an accrual basis or to
index capital income for the eﬀect of inﬂation on asset values. Thus all accounting can be done on a cash
ﬂow basis which is relatively easier to administer. Furthermore, unlike in a comprehensive income tax,
5of  I and  C are likely to be diﬀerent.
2.2. The Government Budget Constraint
The government has exogenous revenue requirements equal to R.D e n o t i n g b y E,t h e
expectation operator with respect to the joint distribution of  I,  C and η,t h eg o v e r n m e n t






− α = R (2.3)
Hence the government budget constraint holds in expected value terms9.
2.3. The Taxpayer’s Budget Constraint
Since no taxes are levied in the ﬁrst period, thus, the ﬁrst period budget constraint is
C1 + S = I1 (2.4)
Second period disposable income is ID
2 =( S + η) − θIO =( 1− θ)(S + η) − θ I + α,
hence, after the imposition of the consumption tax, second period consumption is
C2 =( 1− θ)(1− τ)(S + η) − θ(1 − τ) I − τ C +( 1− τ)α (2.5)
Substituting 2.1 and 2.2 in 2.3, the government budget constraint can be simpliﬁed
and rewritten as
(1 − τ)α = S {θ + τ (1 − θ)} − R (2.6)
Using 2.6 to eliminate α from 2.5, the second period budget constraint of the taxpayer
is
C2 (Γ)=( S − R)+η (1 − θ)(1− τ) − θ(1 − τ) I − τ C (2.7)
Since the average tax proceeds are returned back to the taxpayer, net taxes on the
non-stochastic component of income are zero. It is obvious from 2.7 that the two types of
risks- the income risk (captured by the term η) and the measurement error risk (captured
by the terms  I and  C) can be partially or fully oﬀset by taxation.
returns to capital which take an imputed form, such as rent on housing, need not be measured”.
8Cremer and Gavhari (1995, 1999) and Mirrlees (1990) write the government budget constraint by
setting θ =0 , which is admissible in their model because one of the two taxes is redundant in the presence
of the other. However, in the presence of administrative problems, where the two tax bases might be faced
with diﬀerent measurement problems, setting θ =0is not admissible; indeed as shall be demonstrated
below, both optimal taxes are generally positive.
9On such issues see the discussion in Myles (1995). One possible justiﬁcation for the form of the
government budget constraint in 2.3 is that given the ‘information currently available’ to the government
and the ‘relevant economic theory’ i.e. the income generation process, the LHS of 2.3 is the rational
expectations prediction of the tax revenues.
62.4. Sequence of Moves
The government acts as the Stackelberg leader and commits to a tax vector Γ.T h e
taxpayer observes Γ a n dt h e nm a k e st h eﬁrst period savings-consumption choice, following
which, in the second period, the announced tax policy is implemented with measurement
errors. The two stage game is solved by backward induction.
2.5. Preferences of the Taxpayer
The taxpayer’s preferences are of the CARA form, and are additively separable in C1 and
C2, thus, expected utility is given by
E [U (C1,C 2)] = E [−exp(−ρC1)] + E [−exp(−ρC2)] (2.8)
where ρ>0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The strategy of using normally
distributed error terms and CARA preferences is adopted from a related literature in
agency theory10, which substantially simpliﬁes a fairly complex problem, to which, the
general case might yield either no results or those of limited signiﬁcance.
2.6. Preferences of the Government
After substituting for the taxpayer’s optimal choices in 2.8, the indirect utility of the
taxpayer is given by V (Γ). The objective of the government is to maximize V (Γ) by a
suitable choice of Γ. The lumpsum transfer α is already substituted out using 2.6, hence,
the government’s problem is an unconstrained one.
3. Solution to the Optimal Tax Problem
Start with the second stage of the game, namely, the saving-consumption decision of the
taxpayer. The taxpayer’s problem, conditional on the tax vector Γ,i st oc h o o s eC1 and
C2 in order to maximize 2.8 subject to the two budget constraints, 2.4 and 2.7. First
period consumption is non-random, so E [−exp(−ρC1)] = −exp(−ρC1).F r o m2 . 7 ,C2 is
normally distributed, and using a standard result in statistics11, one can evaluate expected
utility explicitly and show that E [−exp(−ρC2)] = −exp(−ρξ (S,Γ)),w h e r eξ (S,Γ),t h e
certainty equivalent, is given by

















C +2 θτ (1 − τ)σIC
ª
(3.1)
10In multidimensional moral hazard models, a principal observes several imperfect signals of an agent’s
eﬀort; for example Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990, 1991). Holmstrom and Milgrom also show that for
this case, the optimal (private) incentive scheme between the principal and an agent is linear in the
observed signals. Hence, veiwing taxation as a (social) contract between the government and the taxpayer,
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s results suggest that the linear taxes used in this paper do not involve loss in
generality.





7The certainty equivalent is increasing in the expected value of consumption (ﬁrst term
in 3.1) and decreasing in its variance (second term in 3.1). Substituting the two budget
constraints, 2.4 and 2.7 into the objective function 2.8, the taxpayer’s optimal savings
choice, conditional on Γ, S∗ = S∗ (Γ), is found from the following unconstrained problem
S
∗ ∈ argmaxE [U (S,Γ)] = −exp{−ρ(I − S)} − exp{−ρξ (S,Γ)}
The ﬁrst order condition to the taxpayer’s problem can be seen to imply that ξ (S,Γ)=






















C +2 θτ (1 − τ)σIC
ª
(3.2)
The ﬁrst term in 3.2 captures the intertemporal consumption smoothing role of sav-
ings while the second term, which is more fully explored in Section 4.3, illustrates the
precautionary savings. Substituting S∗ (Γ) into 3.1 one gets ξ (Γ)=ξ (S∗ (Γ),Γ).
Since the government is the Stackelberg leader, its ﬁrst stage problem is to choose Γ
to maximize the indirect utility of the representative taxpayer, given by
V (Γ)=−exp{−ρ(I − S
∗ (Γ))} − exp{−ρξ (S
∗ (Γ),Γ)}




2 (1 − θ)σ
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η − θ(1 − τ)
2 σ
2
I − τ (1 − τ)σIC ≤ 0; θ ≥ 0 (3.3)
∂V (Γ)
∂τ




2 (1 − τ)σ
2
I − θ(1 − 2τ)σIC − τσ
2
C ≤ 0; τ ≥ 0 (3.4)
The ﬁrst term in 3.3 captures ‘income-risk sharing’ between the government and the tax-
payer on account of the income tax; this is the ‘social insurance eﬀect’ in Varian (1980)
and Eaton and Rosen (1980). The second term is the increased risk to the taxpayer on
account of measurement errors in income; this is roughly analogous to various forms of the
‘measurement risk eﬀects’ in Stern (1982), Mirrlees (1990) and Dhami (2002). The third
term is the ‘covariance eﬀect’; correlation in the two measurement errors aﬀects the overall
risk facing the taxpayer, and hence, has an aﬀect on the optimal tax rates. The precise
aﬀect depends on whether risks increase or decrease; this is examined in more detail below.
An interpretation similar to that of 3.3 applies to 3.4 except for the last term, which takes
account of measurement errors in the consumption tax base.
Denote the solution to the optimal taxes, found by jointly solving 3.3 and 3.4, by
(θ
∗,τ∗); α∗ can be found residually from the government budget constraint 2.3.
83.1. Some benchmark and limiting results
This section derives some useful limiting results that help to build subsequent intuition
about the results.
Proposition 1 : If there are no tax administration problems (i.e. σ2
I = σ2
C = σIC =0 )
and there is no income uncertainty (i.e. σ2
η =0 ), then, a poll tax is optimal i.e. θ
∗ = τ∗ =0
and α∗ = −R. However, when income is uncertain but administration problems are absent,
then either (θ
∗,τ∗)=( 1 ,0) or (θ
∗,τ∗)=( 0 ,1).
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 establishes the optimality of a poll tax under certainty;
this result is also derived in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Atkinson (1977), Deaton and
Stern (1986)12.
The second part of Proposition 1 illustrates the ‘social insurance role of taxation’
as in Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980), namely, that income taxes allow the
government and the taxpayer to share risks, however, its implications go slightly further.
First, in the absence of tax administration issues, as (θ
∗,τ∗)=( 1 ,0) and (θ
∗,τ∗)=( 0 ,1)
are equally admissible, the consumption and the income taxes are equally suited to the
social insurance role. Hence, the presumed superiority of income taxes in sharing risks
arises because the full set of tax instruments is generally not considered. Second, Cremer
and Gahvari (1995: 53) ask why, given that labor supply is exogenous in Varian (1980), is
not the optimal tax a 100% income tax ”; Proposition 1 shows that a 100% income tax is
indeed optimal, but so is a 100% consumption tax.
Deﬁne r =
σIC
σIσC as the correlation coeﬃcient between  I and  C.
Corollary 1 : Under income certainty (i.e. σ2
η =0 ), but in the presence of tax adminis-
tration problems (i.e. σ2
I,σ2
C,σIC 6=0 )i fr 6= ±1 then a poll tax is optimal. But, if r = ±1
then there is a multiplicity of non-zero tax solutions.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that, in the absence of the social insurance role of
taxation, if income and consumption taxes are associated with measurement error risks
then it is best to impose a poll tax that imposes no such risks on the representative
taxpayer. In the special case where r = ±1 i.e. the two measurement errors are perfectly
correlated then the measurement error risk imposed on the taxpayer through one tax is
completely oﬀset through the other tax. If r = −1 then risks are completely oﬀset by
strictly positive taxes while if r =+ 1then a combination of a consumption tax and an
income subsidy is optimal. In general, this special case (r = ±1) allows for a multiplicity
of optimal tax solutions.
Lemma 1 :I fσ2
I, σ2
C,a n dσIC are bounded but σ2
η →∞then θ
∗ = τ∗ =1 .
T h ei n t u i t i o nc a nb es e e nf r o mt h et e r m(1 − τ)
2 (1 − θ)
2 σ2
η in the expression for the
taxpayer’s certainty equivalent (equation 3.1). Thus, when σ2
η is high, the eﬀect of income
12Although these results were derived using non-linear taxes in this literature, linear taxes are optimal
in this paper; see footnote 9 above
9uncertainty can be countered by increasing the magnitude of both taxes. High taxes also
increase the measurement error risk (see the other terms in 3.1), however, when σ2
η →∞ ,
considerations of ‘social insurance’ overweigh measurement risk eﬀects.
Lemma 2 :I fσ2
η, σ2
C,a n dσIC are bounded and σ2
I →∞then θ
∗ = τ∗ =0 .
L e m m a2r e ﬂects the sequential nature of the two taxes; the consumption tax is levied
after the imposition of the income tax, so it inherits the measurement problems associated
with the income tax base. Hence, when σ2
I →∞ , both tax rates are optimally zero, thus,
a particular tax might provide an excellent social insurance role, but measurability issues
might limit its use
Lemma 3 :I fσ2
η, σ2
I,a n dσIC are bounded and σ2
C →∞then θ
∗ 6=0 , τ∗ =0 .
Thus, if the consumption tax base is impossible to measure, it should not be taxed.
However, the income tax base is unaﬀected by measurement problems in the consumption
tax base, hence, the optimal income tax is non-zero.
4. Comparative Static Results and Optimal Tax Formulae
The comparative static results are substantially simpliﬁed when σIC =0and one can
derive explicit formulae for the optimal tax rates that have substantial pedagogical merit.
Hence, the discussion below is separated into the two cases, namely, σIC =0and σIC 6=0 .
4.1. Uncorrelated measurement errors (σIC =0 )
When σIC =0 ,t h eﬁrst order conditions 3.3 and 3.4 can be jointly solved, explicitly, for
the optimal tax rates, θ


























Proposition 2 : The optimal tax rates θ
∗ and τ∗ are increasing in the extent of income
uncertainty, σ2
η, and decreasing in the imprecision associated with measuring their respec-
tive tax bases, σ2
I and σ2
C. Furthermore, measurement problems create “spillover eﬀects”-
τ∗ is increasing in σ2
I while θ
∗ is unaﬀected by σ2
C.
As income uncertainty (captured by σ2
η) increases, both tax rates optimally perform a
‘social insurance role’. As the informativeness of an observed tax base decreases (i.e. σ2
I or
σ2
C increases) that tax is optimally reduced to mitigate the measurement error risk facing
the taxpayer. In diﬀerent contexts, Stern (1982), Mirrlees (1990), and Dhami (2002) also
10ﬁnd that measurement problems reduce the optimal tax rate. Finally, ∂τ∗
∂σ2
I > 0 demon-
strates ‘spillover eﬀects’ from one tax base to the other; despite σIC =0 , administrative
problems with one tax base aﬀect the optimal tax rate on the other tax base. The intuition
c a nb es e e nb ya ne x a m i n a t i o no ft h ee x p r e s s i o nf o rt h et a x p a y e r ’ sn e tc o n s u m p t i o ni n
2.7; an increase in τ reduces θ(1 − τ) I, which is the exposure to measurement error risk
on account of measurement problems in the income tax base. Finally, given the sequential
nature of the two taxes, with the income tax levied before the consumption tax, the income
tax is unaﬀected by measurement errors with the consumption tax base.

















Proposition 3 : The relative optimal tax rates, θ∗
τ∗, depend inversely on the following. (a)




C, in measuring the two tax bases. (b) The imprecision in mea-




η. (c) Income-risk relative to impreci-






Proposition 3 formalizes at least two intuitive ideas. First, ceteris paribus, the debate
on the relative magnitude of the income and the consumption taxes rests, at least partially,
as Bradford (1980) argues, on an issue of measurability; optimal taxes on relatively easier
to measure tax bases are relatively higher. Second, the optimal taxes are relatively higher
when, roughly, their social insurance role is more important than the measurement error
risk that they impose. The results in Propositions 2 and 3 can have interesting implications
for the following issues in tax theory.
1. Direct versus indirect taxes: Why do developing countries, unlike developed coun-
tries, raise the bulk of their tax revenues through indirect taxes relative to direct
taxes? It is often argued that the explanation lies in the relative diﬃculty of mea-
suring income in developing countries for reasons such as the paucity of recorded
transactions, corrupt tax administration etc.; for example Burgess and Stern (1993).
This conforms to the result in Proposition 3.
2. Taxation of Fixed Factors: Economic theory demonstrates that taxes on ﬁxed factors
(for example land and capital) are eﬃcient; indeed in the presence of such taxes
there is no need for other taxes. However, why do such taxes account for a relatively
small proportion of actual governmental tax revenues? One possible explanation,
consistent with the predictions of Proposition 3, lies in the relative diﬃculty of
measuring ﬁxed factors. Two such taxes are considered below.
2(a) Land taxes: Bird (1974: 223) contends that “...the administrative constraint on
eﬀective land tax administration is so severe in most developing countries today that
virtually all the more reﬁned ﬁscal devices beloved of theorists can and should be
discarded for this reason alone.” Similar problems are raised in Newbery (1987) and
11Skinner (1996). Land quality, which is one of the crucial elements in the deﬁnition
of the land tax base, is hard to measure and requires ascertaining the soil type and
quality, rainfall, irrigation facilities etc. Proxies for the land tax base such as capital
value assessment, value of the produce on land, site value etc. are riddled with
similar measurement problems; for example Bird (1974). Hence usage of the land
tax is extremely limited and has historically declined.
2(b) Capital stock taxes: A capital tax is levied directly on the capital stock by state or
federal authorities in many countries such as United States, Canada, and Germany,
at fairly low tax rates ranging from 0.25 to 0.50 percent, with generous exemptions.
Although, a tax on the stock of capital that a ﬁrm owns is non distortionary, there
exist well known diﬃculties in the measurement of the capital stock justifying the
low taxation (or even exemption) of the tax base.
3. Time Inconsistency Issues: In an often cited example in the time inconsistency lit-
erature, the government announces that new capital is tax exempt, but once the
new capital is in place, the government can renege and impose a 100 percent capital
tax which is ex-post non-distortionary. Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that if mea-
surement problems associated with the ﬁxed tax base are acute, it is not eﬃcient
to impose a high, conﬁscatory tax, even if the government has the discretion to do
so. This argument provides a possible ‘optimal tax’ supplement to reputation based
explanations for the absence of 100 percent capital taxes13.
4.2. Correlated measurement errors (σIC 6=0 )
Correlation in the measurement errors (i.e. σIC 6=0 ) can have an important aﬀect on
the overall risk facing the taxpayer. This can be seen easily from the expression for the
certainty equivalent in 3.1 or from the ﬁrst order conditions in 3.3 and 3.4. To focus on
the aﬀects of σIC assume that all other exogenous variables are ﬁxed. In general, the
comparative static aﬀects of σIC are not easy to sign. Proposition 4 provides some results
in a subset of the cases.
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T h ec o v a r i a n c et e r m ,σIC, performs a role similar to that of ‘yardstick competition’ in
the moral hazard literature, whereby the observation of two correlated signals of an agent’s
eﬀort allows the principal to ﬁlter some of the risk facing a risk-averse agent and allows for
improved incentives; for example Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990,
1991). Proposition 4 shows when a variant of these results applies to a social contract
between a government and a taxpayer. One is looking at circumstances when an increase
in σIC increases the taxpayer’s share of the cake (in the analogous agency situation this is
the agent’s share of the surplus). The ﬁrst condition in the Proposition shows that when
13This is not meant to trivialize the time inconsistency literature which is clearly important, but to




C is low then τ decreases with σIC for in this case, the social insurance role of taxation
foregone relative to the measurement risks it imposes is small. Hence better risk sharing
implied by a higher σIC ﬁlters out some of the risk facing the taxpayer allowing for a
reduction in taxes. A similar interpretation can be given to the second half of Proposition
4 which requires that σ2
I/σ2
η be large relative to σ2
C/σ2
η for θ to respond negatively to σIC.
4.3. Precautionary behavior
The model brings out some simple but important implications for precautionary be-
havior. When income is ex-ante uncertain and taxpayers are risk averse, one would expect
them to engage in precautionary savings. Varian (1980) uses quadratic preferences, thus,
the zero third derivative precludes precautionary behavior14. Strawczynski (1998) identi-
ﬁes precautionary savings by performing simulation techniques on a log utility version of
the Varian (1980) model.
Since the third derivative is strictly positive for CARA preferences, the taxpayer en-
gages in precautionary savings. A drawback of CARA preferences is that precautionary
savings are independent of wealth, however, this does not aﬀect other qualitative results.
Since the taxpayer treats the tax vector Γ as given when making the consumption-saving































All three partial derivatives are positive, therefore, the taxpayer engages in precau-
tionary savings with respect to future uncertainty arising from (1) income and (2) tax
administration problems. Within models of precautionary savings, the second eﬀect is a
relatively novel result. These results complement the results in Strawczynski (1998) and
provide the theoretical counterpart to his simulation results.
5. Optimal Commodity Taxation: Diﬀerentiated or Uniform?
The Ramsey model derives optimal consumption taxes in a representative taxpayer setting
when eﬃciency is the sole objective of taxation. If the two consumption goods are identical
in all respects (for instance, identical compensated elasticities) then uniform commodity
taxation is optimal. The stylized model of this section shows that for two identical com-
modities, if the respective tax bases are measured with diﬀerent degrees of imprecision,
14Precautionary savings require a positive third derivative, see for example Leland (1968).
13then uniform commodity taxation is not optimal. Indeed, if one of the two commodities
is measured relatively more imprecisely it will be taxed at a lower rate15.
To ﬁx ideas in a simple manner, modify the model in Section 2 as follows. Interpret
the two dated consumption goods, C1 and C2,a st w od i ﬀerent consumption goods in a
static timeless model16. The two goods are identical for all purposes, except for their
measurability characteristics (for purposes of taxation). The before-tax price of each good
is identically equal to unity. Preferences take the CARA form and are additively separable
in the two goods:
E [U (C1,C 2)] = E [−exp(−ρC1)] + E [−exp(−ρC2)] (5.1)
The government levies the income tax (θ,α), and a consumption tax on each the two
goods at respective rates τ1 and τ2. For tax purposes, the observed signal on the income
tax base continues to be given by 2.1, while 2.2 is modiﬁed to reﬂect the two observed
signals on the two consumption tax bases, CO
1 and CO
2 respectively, as follows:
C
O
1 = ID + γ1
C
O
2 = ID + γ2
where γ1 and γ2 are respectively zero mean, normally distributed, measurement errors
with respective variances σ2
1 and σ2
2; both errors are assumed to be uncorrelated with the
income uncertainty term η and, for analytical simplicity, also with each other.
The sequence of moves is as follows. The government is the Stackelberg leader and
announces the tax vector Γ =( α,θ,τ1,τ2) followed by the (static) allocation of income, I,
by the taxpayer among the two consumption goods, C1 and C2. Since the solution to the
model is similar to that in Section 3, the details are conﬁned to the appendix.









1.U n l e s sσ2
1 = σ2
2,d i ﬀer-
ential commodity taxes dominate uniform commodity taxation.
The main message of Proposition 5 is that optimal consumption taxes ought to be
tailored to the measurability characteristics of various commodities. Consumption goods
that can be measured less precisely ought to be taxed at lower rates. An extreme example
is the tax exemption of the returns from certain assets such as a house, car, equity of certain
types, bequests, and inheritances, under the ‘registered asset version’ of consumption taxes,
on account of the extreme diﬃculty of measuring such returns.
It is, however, possible to derive an even stronger and unexpected result when the
measurement errors in the two consumption tax bases are correlated with the income
15The results in this section can be easily modiﬁed to address the issue of uniform versus diﬀerentiated
taxation of diﬀerent sources of income. Since the treatment of these issues is analogous, but it is issues of
uniform versus diﬀerentiated commodity taxes that typically receive more attention, it is omitted.
16For a treatment of alternative consumption tax systems in a dynamic setting with consumption-savings
choice under uncertainty and measurement problems, see Dhami (2002).
14uncertainty term. The presence of such correlation depends on the plausible assumption
that the size of the measurement errors depends on the size of the disposable income. In
this case, uniform commodity taxation is not optimal even when the relative imprecision
in measuring the two consumption goods is identical.
To demonstrate this result, assume that the imprecision in measuring each of the two
consumption tax bases is σ2
1 = σ2
2 = σ2. Denote the covariance between the measurement
errors  I and γj, j =1 ,2,a sσIj. Proposition 6 below shows that if σI1 6= σI2 then
commodities that provide a better risk-hedging role are taxed at a relatively higher rate;
uniform commodity taxation is not optimal.




2 is increasing in σI1 − σI2.
Greater covariance between two sources of uncertainty allows the risks facing the tax-
payer to be ﬁltered out to a greater extent, hence, it is optimal to diﬀerentiate the tax
treatment of the two consumption goods. Propositions 5 and 6 show, in two stylized con-
texts, that administrative issues have important, but hitherto ignored, implications for
t h ec h o i c eb e t w e e nu n i f o r ma n dd i ﬀerential commodity taxes. Future research can use
the template provided above in a fairly abstract and general context, to look at speciﬁc
sources of measurement errors and institutional detail.
6. Conclusions
This paper incorporates administrative issues into optimal tax models under uncer-
tainty; an endeavour termed by Slemrod (1990) as a theory of ‘Optimal Tax Systems’. It
focuses on one important implication of administrative problems, namely, that tax bases
must be diﬃcult or costly to measure. In spirit, the model is the one originally used in
Varian (1980). However, it is extended to allow for tax administration considerations and
the full set of (linear) tax instruments. One of the strengths of the model is its simplicity,
and pedagogical merit in providing several closed form solutions. The model also provides
a useful template for optimal tax theorists working in the general area of taxation under
uncertainty- an area which has not progressed a great deal since the seminal works of
Varian, Eaton and Rosen more than two decades ago.
Some of the results are as follows. Measurement problems reduce the optimal tax
rates; in the limit as such problems become too severe, they might even override the
‘social insurance role’ of taxation. The social insurance role of taxation can be provided
by consumption taxes − a role that often seems in the literature to be ascribed to income
taxes alone. The relative magnitudes of the income and consumption taxes are proportional
to the relative ease of measuring the income tax base relative to the consumption tax base
− a conjecture made by Bradford (1980) as the most important distinction in the choice
between direct and indirect taxes. Errors in the measurement of a tax base can have
‘spillover eﬀects’ by aﬀecting the optimal tax rate on another base. In a stylized application
of the basic model to consumption taxes, it is shown that even in circumstances where the
Ramsey taxes are predicted to be uniform, diﬀerences in the measurability characteristics
15of diﬀerent commodities imply diﬀerentiated optimal commodity taxes. The model also
derives implications for precautionary savings in the presence of income and administrative
uncertainty.
Although measurement problems could arise due to a wide variety of reasons, these are
considered exogenous in the paper. Endogenous treatment of measurement problems has
the potential to produce a rich range of diﬀerentiated models of ‘Optimal Tax Systems’.
This remains an important challenge and will reduce the gap between the theory and
practice of taxation − an endeavour that seemed vital for the pioneers of optimal tax
theory.
7. Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : Evaluating 3.3 and 3.4 at σ2
η = σ2
I = σ2
C = σIC =0 ,i tf o l l o w st h a t
θ
∗ = τ∗ =0 . Hence, a poll tax optimally raises all revenues i.e. α∗ = −R. Evaluating 3.3
and 3.4 at σ2
I = σ2




2 (1 − θ)σ
2
η ≤ 0; θ ≥ 0
∂V (Γ)
∂τ
=( 1− τ)(1− θ)
2 σ
2
η ≤ 0; τ ≥ 0
(θ
∗,τ∗)=( 0 ,0) cannot be a solution, for in that case,
∂V(Γ)
∂θ > 0 and
∂V(Γ)
∂τ > 0,
contradicting the optimality of (θ
∗,τ∗)=( 0 ,0). It is easy to check that (θ
∗,τ∗)=( 1 ,0)
and (θ
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2 (1 − τ)σ
2
I − θ(1 − 2τ)σIC − τσ
2
C ≤ 0; τ ≥ 0 (7.2)
Two corner solutions are readily eliminated. First, θ




I 6=0 , which violates the complementary slackness condition in 7.1.
Second, θ
∗ =0 ,τ∗ 6=0 , cannot be solution because τ
∂V(Γ)
∂τ = −τσ2
C 6=0 , which violates the
complementary slackness condition in 7.2. Using analogous reasoning it can be checked
that θ
∗ = τ∗ =0is a valid solution which does not violate the complementary slackness
conditions. Hence, in this case, a poll tax, α∗ = −R, is optimal. It remains to check the
ﬁnal possibility i.e. θ
∗ 6=0and τ∗ 6=0 . In this case, using 7.1, θ c a nb es o l v e di nt e r m so f
τ as θ =
τσC
(1−τ)σIr. Substituting θ in 7.2 the latter can be rewritten as
∂V(Γ)
∂τ = σ2
C (r2 − 1).
The complementary slackness conditions imply that the solution θ
∗ 6=0and τ∗ 6=0can
only be supported if
∂V(Γ)
∂τ =0 , which requires that r = ±1. ¥
16P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Evaluating 3.3 and 3.4 at θ
∗ = τ∗ =0 , in the limit as σ2
η →∞ ,i t
follows that
∂V(Γ)
∂θ > 0 and
∂V(Γ)
∂τ > 0, violating the supposed optimality of θ
∗ = τ∗ =0 .I t
can be checked that the only solution which does not violate the complementary slackness
condition is θ
∗ = τ∗ =1 . ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : Evaluating 3.3 and 3.4 in the limit as σ2





∂τ =0require that θ
∗ = τ∗ =0 . ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :T h eﬁrst order condition 3.3 is independent of σ2
C. Suppose that
τ∗ 6=0 ,t h e na sσ2
C →∞ , it follows that τ
∂V(Γ)
∂τ = −∞, violating the complementary
slackness condition in 3.4, hence, τ∗ =0 . ¥
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η > 0, ∂θ∗
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I < 0, ∂τ∗
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : Totally diﬀerentiate 3.3 and 3.4. holding ﬁxed, all exogenous
variables, other than σIC, to get the following matrix equation system
AX = Y (7.3)
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The matrix A is simply the Hessian matrix of second order partial derivatives i.e.
D2V (Γ) which is negative semi-deﬁnite, hence, the determinant of A, denoted as detA is




























dσIC < 0 if τσ2

































































2, then using 7.6, dθ








Proof of Proposition 5: The government’s income tax revenues equal θIO − α,w h i l e
consumption tax revenues equal τ1CO
1 + τ2CO







− α = R. The budget constraint of the taxpayer is given by






. Using the government budget constraint to
eliminate α from the taxpayer’s budget constraint, the latter can be written as a function
of C2, conditional on the tax vector Γ announced by the government:
C1 = C1 (C2 | Γ)=( I − R)+( 1− τ1 − τ2){(1 − θ)η − θ I} − τ1γ1 − τ2γ2 − C2 (7.7)
Since the government is the Stackelberg leader, conditional on the tax vector Γ,t h e
taxpayer chooses C1 and C2 in order to maximize 5.1 subject to the constraint C1 =
C1 (C2 | Γ) in 7.7. Substitute the constraint into 5.1 to get an unconstrained prob-
lem. Note that E [−exp(−ρC2)] = −exp(−ρC2),s i n c eC2 is parametrically ﬁxed while
E [−exp(−ρC1)] = −exp(−ρξ1),w h e r eξ1, the certainty equivalent, is given by
























Hence, the taxpayer chooses C1 and C2 to solve the following unconstrained problem
Maximize E[U (C1,C 2)] = −exp{−ρξ1 (Γ,C 2)} − exp{−ρC2}
The ﬁrst order condition to the taxpayer’s problem can be seen to imply that ξ1 (Γ,C 2)=




























Substituting C2 (Γ) into 7.7 one gets the optimal choice of the taxpayer, C1 = C1 (Γ).
Hence, the optimal solution to the taxpayer’s problem is summarized as (C1 (Γ),C 2 (Γ)).
Since the government is the Stackelberg leader, the ﬁrst stage problem is to choose
Γ =( α,θ,τ1,τ2) to maximize the indirect utility of the representative taxpayer given by:
E [U (C1 (Γ),C 2 (Γ))] = −exp(−ρξ1 (Γ,C 2 (Γ))) − exp(−ρC2 (Γ))







I ≤ 0; θ ≥ 0 (7.8)
∂E[U (Γ)]
∂τ1












1 ≤ 0; τ1 ≥ 0 (7.9)
∂E[U (Γ)]
∂τ2












2 ≤ 0; τ2 ≥ 0 (7.10)








1, as claimed in the proposition.¥
18Proof of Proposition 6: The proof follows that of Proposition 5 closely; it can be checked
that the certainty equivalent in this case is:














2} +2( 1− τ1 − τ2)θ{τ1σI1 + τ2σI2}
¾
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to τ1 and τ2 for the government’s problem are:
∂E[U (Γ)]
∂τ1


























2−θσI2 {1 − 2τ2 − τ1}+θτ1σI1 =0
(7.12)
Dividing 7.11 by 7.12 and simplifying, check that the following condition holds:







When σI1 6= σI2 it follows that τ1 6= τ2. To check the second part of the proposition
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